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THE INTELLECTUALS AND THE POWERS SOME PERSPECTIVES FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In religion, in art, in all spheres of culture and politics, the mass of mankind in all hitherto known societies have not, except for transitory interludes, been preoccupied with the attainment of an immediate contact with the ultimate principles implicit in their beliefs and standards. The directly gratifying ends of particular actions, the exigencies of situations, considerations of individual and familial advantage, concrete moral maxims, concrete prescriptions and prohibitions, preponderate in the conduct of the majority of persons in most societies, large and small. The systematic coherence and the deeper and more general ground of beliefs and standards only intermittently hold their attention and touch on their passions. Ordinary life in every society is characterized by an unequal intensity of attachment to ultimate values, be they cognitive, moral, or aesthetic, and an unequal intensity of the need for coherence. Ordinary life shuns rigorous definition and consistent adherence to traditional or rational rules, and it has no need for continuous contact with the sacred. Ordinary life is slovenly, full of compromise and improvisation; it goes on in the "here and now."

In every society, however, there are some persons with an unusual sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe and the rules which govern their society. There is in every society a minority of persons who, more than the ordinary run of their fellow men, are inquiring, and desirous of being in frequent communion with symbols which are more general than

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the immediate concrete situations of everyday life and remote in their reference in both time and space. In this minority, there is a need to externalize this quest in oral and written discourse, in poetic or plastic expression, in historical reminiscence or writing, in ritual performance and acts of worship. This interior need to penetrate beyond the screen of immediate concrete experience marks the existence of the intellectuals in every society.

The Tasks of Intellectuals

The personal need alone does not, however, create the body of intellectuals, nor does it determine its magnitude or its position within the structure of society. In every society, even among those sections of the population without the very pronounced sensitivity to remote symbols which characterizes the intellectuals, there is an intermittent need for contact with the sacred, and this gives rise to a demand for priests and theologians and to institutions or procedures for the education of these in the techniques and meanings of their functions. In every society, among those who cannot create images in the form of stories or pictures or statues or other works or art, there is still a considerable fraction which is receptive and indeed even demanding of the gratification provided by verbal images, colors, and forms. These persons provide the demand for art and literature, even though they themselves cannot create art or literature. Every society has a need for contact with its own past, and in more differentiated societies rulers seek to strengthen their claim to legitimacy by showing the continuity of their regimes with the great personalities of the past. Where this cannot be provided by the powers of individual memory within the kinship group, historical chroniclers and antiquarians are required. Correspondingly, ecclesiastical and proto-ecclesiastical bodies must likewise show the spiritual wealth of their antecedents and their living relevance; this gives rise to hagiography and the activity of the hagiographer. In societies on larger then tribal scale, with complex tasks and traditions, the education—at least of those who are expected to become rulers or the associates, counselors, and aides of rulers—is called for; this requires teachers and a system of educational institutions. In any society which transcends the scale of a kinship group, in which the

organs of authority acquire a more or less continuous existence, there is a need for administrators capable of keeping records and issuing rules and decrees. These activities require a certain fairly high level of education, which in turn requires institutions with teaching staffs, whether they be palace schools or privately or state-conducted academies or universities. Members of every society, and above all those who exercise authority in it, need to have at least intermittently some sense of the stability, coherence, and orderliness of their society; they need therefore a body of symbols, such as songs, histories, poems, biographies, constitutions, etc., which diffuse a sense of affinity among the members of the society.

The intellectuals' activities and their situation in society are the products of a compromise and an articulation of the intellectual disposition and the needs of society for those actions which can be performed only by persons who of necessity, by virtue of the actions they perform, are intellectuals. The larger the society and the more complex the tasks its rulers undertake, the greater the need therefore for a body of religious and secular intellectuals.

All these needs would exist even if there were no especially sensitive, inquiring, curious, creative minds in the society. There would be intellectuals in society even if there were no intellectuals by disposition.[1]

The Functions of Intellectuals

The moral and intellectual unity of a society, which in the size of its population and its territory goes beyond what any one man can know from his average firsthand experience and which brings him into contact with persons outside his kinship group, depends on such intellectual institutions as schools, churches, newspapers, and similar structures. Through these, ordinary persons, in childhood, youth, or adulthood, enter into contact, however extensive, with those who are most familiar with the existing body of cultural values. By means of preaching, teaching, and writing, intellectuals infuse into sections of the population which are intellectual neither by inner vocation

1. The demand for intellectual services can sometimes exceed the supply of qualified persons; it will always exceed the supply of truly creative individuals. More frequently, however, modern societies have experienced an excess of the supply of technically qualified persons over the demand for their services.

nor by social role, a perceptiveness and an imagery which they would otherwise lack. By the provision of such techniques as reading and writing and calculation, they enable the laity to enter into a wider universe. The creation of nations out of tribes, in early modern times in Europe and in contemporary Asia and Africa, is the work of intellectuals, just as the formation of the American nation out of diverse ethnic groups is partly the work of teachers, clergymen, and journalists. The legitimation of the reigning authority is naturally a function of many factors, including the tendencies within a population towards submission to and rejection of authority, the effectiveness of the authority in maintaining order, showing strength, and dispensing a semblance of justice. The legitimacy of authority is, however, a function of what its subjects believe about it; beliefs about authority are far from resting entirely on firsthand experience, and much of what is believed beyond first-hand experience is the product of traditions and teachings which are the gradually accumulated and attenuated product of the activities of intellectuals.

Through their provision of models and standards, by the presentation of symbols to be appreciated, intellectuals elicit, guide, and form the expressive dispositions within a society. Not that the expressive life of a society is under the exclusive dominion of its intellectuals. Indeed the situation has never existed—and in fact could never exist—in which the expressive life of a society, its aesthetic tastes, its artistic creation, or the ultimately aesthetic grounds of its ethical judgments fell entirely within the traditions espoused by the intellectuals of the society. Societies vary in the extent to which the expressive actions and orientations are in accordance with what is taught and represented by the dominant intellectuals. With these variations much of the expressive life of a society, even what is most vulgar and tasteless, echoes some of the expressive elements in the central value system represented by the intellectuals.

The first two functions treated above show the intellectuals infusing into the laity attachments to more general symbols and providing for the laity a means of participation in the central value system. Intellectuals are not, however, concerned only to facilitate this wider participation in certain features of the central value system. They are above all concerned with its more intensive

cultivation, with the elaboration and development of alternative potentialities. Where creativity and originality are emphatically acknowledged and prized, and where innovation is admitted and accepted, this is perceived as a primary obligation of intellectuals. However, even in systems where individual creativity is not seen as a positive value, the labor of powerful minds and irrepressible individualities working on what has been received from the past, modifies the heritage by systematization and rationalization and adapts it to new tasks and obstacles. In this process of elaboration, divergent potentialities of the system of cultural values are made explicit and conflicting positions are established. Each generation of intellectuals performs this elaborating function for its own and succeeding generations, and particularly for the next succeeding generation.

These specifically intellectual functions are performed not only for the intellectuals of a particular society but for the intellectuals of other societies as well. The intellectuals of different societies are ordered in a vague hierarchy, in which the lower learn from the higher. For Southeast Asia, the Indian intellectuals, in the Middle Ages and early modern times, performed this educative function. The intellectuals of republican and imperial Rome learned from Greek intellectuals. For Japan, for a time, Chinese intellectuals performed this function. In modern times, the British intellectuals, through Oxford, Cambridge, and the London School of Economics, have formed the intellectuals of India, Africa, and for a long time the United States. In the nineteenth century, German academic intellectuals provided a worldwide model, just as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries French artistic and literary intellectuals have provided models of development for aesthetically sensitive intellectuals all over the civilized world. In the eighteenth century, the intellectuals of the French Enlightenment inspired their confreres in Spain, Italy, Prussia, and Russia. This function is performed for the intellectual community above all. The laity only comes to share in it at several removes and after a lapse of time.

The function of providing a model for intellectual activity, within and among societies, implies the acceptance of a general criterion of superior quality or achievement. The pattern of action of a certain group of intellectuals comes to be regarded as exemplary because it

is thought to correspond more closely to certain ideal requirements of truth, beauty, or virtue. Such standards are never the objects of complete consensus, but they are often widely accepted over very extensive areas of the world at any given time.

The process of elaborating and developing further the potentialities inherent in a "system" of cultural values entails also the possibility of "rejection" of the inherited set of values in varying degrees of comprehensiveness. In all societies, even those in which the intellectuals are notable for their conservatism, the diverse paths of creativity, as well as an inevitable tendency toward negativism, impel a partial rejection of the prevailing system of cultural values. The very process of elaboration and development involves a measure of rejection. The range of rejection of the inherited varies greatly; it can never be complete and all-embracing. Even where the rejecting intellectuals allege that they are "nihilistic" with respect to everything that is inherited, complete rejection without physical self-annihilation is impossible.

It is practically given by the nature of the intellectuals' orientation that there should be some tension between the intellectuals and the value orientations embodied in the actual institutions of any society. This applies not only to the orientations of the ordinary members of society, i.e., the laity, but to the value orientations of those exercising authority in the society, since it is on them that the intellectuals' attention is most often focused, they being the custodians of the central institutional system. It is not this particular form of "rejection" or alienation which interests us most at the moment. Rather it is the rejection by intellectuals of the inherited and prevailing values of those intellectuals who are already incorporated in ongoing social institutions. This intra-intellectual alienation or dissensus is a crucial part of the intellectual heritage of any society. Furthermore it supplies the important function of molding and guiding the alternative tendencies which exist in any society. It provides an alternative pattern of integration for their own society, and for other societies the intellectuals of which come under their hegemony (e.g. the Fabian socialists in Britain and the Indian intellectuals, or the French and British constitutional liberals of the early nineteenth century and the intellectuals of many countries in Southeastern Europe, South America, Asia, etc.).

It is not only through the presentation of orientations toward general symbols which reaffirm, continue, modify, or reject the society's traditional inheritance of beliefs and standards that intellectuals leave their mark on society. The intellectuals do not exhaust their function through the establishment of a contact for the laity with the sacred values of their society. They fulfill authoritative, power-exercising functions over concrete actions as well. Intellectuals have played a great historical role on the higher levels of state administration, above all in China, in British and independent India, in the Ottoman Empire, and in modern Europe. Sovereigns have often considered a high standard of education, either humanistic or technical-legal, confirmed by diplomas and examinations, necessary for the satisfactory functioning of the state. The judiciary, too, has often been a domain of the intellectuals. In private economic organizations, the employment of intellectuals in administrative capacities has been uncommon to the point of rarity. Nor have intellectuals ever shown any inclination to become business enterprisers. It is only since the nineteenth century that business firms, first in Germany, then in America, and latterly in other industrialized countries, have taken to the large-scale employment of scientists in research departments and, to a much smaller extent, in executive capacities.

Equal in antiquity to the role of the highly educated in state administration is the role of the intellectual as personal agent, counselor, tutor, or friend to the sovereign. Plato's experience in Syracuse, Aristotle's relations with Alexander, Alcuin's with Charlemagne, Hobbes and Charles II prior to the Restoration, Milton and Cromwell, Lord Keynes and the Treasury, and the "Brains Trust" under President F. D. Roosevelt, represent only a few of numerous instances in ancient and modern states, oriental and occidental, in which intellectuals have been drawn into the entourage of rulers, their advice and aid sought, and their approval valued. Again, there are many states and periods in which this has not been so. The court of Wilhelm II, for example, drew relatively little on the educated classes of the time; important episodes of Chinese history are to be seen as a consequence of the intellectuals' reaction to the ruler's refusal to draw them into his most intimate and influential circle of counselors; American administrative and

political history from the time of the Jacksonian revolution until the New Liberalism of Woodrow Wilson, was characterized by the separation of intellectuals from the higher administrative and the legislative branches of government. Intellectuals have emerged occasionally in monarchies at the highest pinnacles of authority, through sheer accident or at least through no deliberate process of selection. Asoka, Marcus Aurelius, Akhnaton, are only a few of the scattered coincidences of sovereignty and the concern with the highest truths. In the last century and a half under conditions of liberal-democratic party politics, Benjamin Disraeli, William Gladstone, F. M. Guizot, Woodrow Wilson, Jawaharlal Nehru, Thomas Masaryk, etc., have provided impressive instances of intellectuals who have been able, by their own efforts and a wide appreciation for their gifts of civil politics enriched by an intensity of intellectual interest and exertion, to play a notable role in the exercise of great political authority. This has not been accidental; liberal and constitutional politics in great modern states and liberal and "progressive" nationalist movements in subject territories have to a large extent been "intellectuals' politics."

Indeed, in modern times, first in the West and then, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, at the peripheries of Western civilization and the Orient, the major political vocation of the intellectuals has lain in the enunciation and pursuit of the ideal. Modern liberal and constitutional politics have largely been the creation of intellectuals with bourgeois affinities and sympathies, in societies dominated by landowning and military aristocracies. This has been one major form of the pursuit of the ideal. Another has been the cultivation of ideological politics, i.e., revolutionary politics working outside the circle of constitutional traditions. Prior to the origins of ideological politics (which came into the open with the European Reformation), conspiracies, putsches, and the subversion of the existing regime, although they often involved intellectuals, were not the objects of a particular affinity between intellectuals and revolutionary tendencies. In modern times, however, with the emergence of ideologically dominated political activities as a continuously constitutive part of public life, a genuine affinity has emerged.

Not by any means all intellectuals have been equally attracted by

revolutionary politics. Moderates and partisans in civil politics, quiet apolitical concentration on their specialized intellectual preoccupations, cynical antipolitical passivity, and faithful acceptance and service of the existing order, are all to be found in substantial proportions among modern intellectuals, as among intellectuals in antiquity. Nonetheless, the function of modern intellectuals in furnishing the doctrine of revolutionary movements is to be considered as one of their most important accomplishments.

The Structure of the Intellectual Community

The performance of the functions enumerated above is possible only through a complex set of institutional arrangements. The institutional system in which intellectual objects are reproduced or created has varied markedly in history. Its variations have at least in part been affected by the nature of the intellectual tasks, the volume of the intellectual heritage, the material resources necessary and available for intellectual work, the modes of reproduction of intellectual achievements, and the scope of the audience.

The creation of imaginative works of literature and the production of works of analysis and meditation, at least since the end of the age of anonymity, has been a work of the individual creator, working under his own self-imposed discipline. As regards the actual work of creation, he has been free of the control imposed by corporate organization. Within the limits of what has been made available to him by his culture, he has chosen the tradition under which he was to work, the style, the attitude and the form. Considerations of flattering a prince or pleasing a patron or the reading public or a publisher have often entered extraneously—but not more than that—into the central process of creation; the process of creation itself has always been a process of free choice and adaptation. The avoidance of the strictures of the censor or the displeasure of a tyrant have also been only extraneous factors in a process of individual creation. For this reason the creation of literature has never been corporately organized. The literary man has always been a self-propelling entity. After the development of printing and the emergence of a large reading public, it became possible in the most advanced countries of the Western world for a

small number of successful authors of both superior and inferior literature to earn substantial sums of money and for many to earn enough to maintain themselves. For this to happen required not only a large public, sufficiently well-educated, and relatively inexpensive means of large-scale mechanical reproduction, but a well-organized system of book and periodical distribution (publishers, booksellers, editors), a means of giving publicity to new publications (reviews, bibliographies, and literate convivial circles), and laws protecting rights to intellectual property (copyright laws). In the Western countries and in Japan, where the book trade is relatively well-organized, where there are many periodicals, and where there is a large reading public, there is room for thousands of freelance intellectuals; in other countries in Asia and Africa, the small size of the literate public and the ineffective machinery of publication and distribution, confines to rather a small figure the number of freelance intellectuals. But they exist there nonetheless and represent a genuine innovation in the cultural and social history of these countries.

Prior to these developments—which emerged only in the eighteenth century in Western Europe and later in other cultures—creative literary intellectuals were forced to depend on different sources of income. The minnesingers and troubadours who sought to sell their songs in return for hospitality, the Chinese philosopher-adventurers of the period of the Warring States who sought to enter the employment of princes as their counselors, poets in Moghul courts, the Brahmin pandits at the courts of the Peshwa, and the European humanists as stipendiaries of the ecclesiastical and secular princely courts at the beginning of the modern age, were approximations of the independent freelance intellectual whose wares were supplied for payment. They were not genuinely freelance since they were paid in pensions or stipends or in kind rather than through the sale of their products by contractual agreement. As intellectual clients rather than as autonomous agents, they constituted a patrimonial approximation to the freelance intellectual. The patronage of princes, great noblemen and courtiers, financiers and merchants, has contributed greatly to the support of the intellectual activities of those who inherited no wealth, at a time and in fields of intellectual activity in which the sale of intellectual products could

not find a large and wealthy enough public of purchasers. The creation of sinecures in government for literary men has been one form of patronage which shades off into gainful employment in the career of the civil servant. This latter means of maintenance, which was known in China over several millennia, has found many practitioners in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the West, above all in Great Britain. Diplomacy, military service, employment in commerce and even industry, have provided the livelihood of many authors for whom literature has been an avocation. Thus, patronage, sinecures, and government service, together with the most favorable of all, the independent position of the aristocrat, gentry, and rentier-intellectual who lived from inherited wealth, provided almost the sole means of maintenance for those who aspired to do intellectual work. These were appropriate not only to literary creation but to philosophy, science, and scholarship. These were the ways in which the greatest poets and philosophers of antiquity lived—except for the Sophists, who were freelance intellectuals—as well as the great Chinese and Persian poets, the humanist scholars of the European Renaissance, and the leading scientists of early modern times.

Those intellectuals who took as their task the cultivation of the sacred symbols of religious life lived either in monasteries, endowed by wealthy patrons, or by begging for their daily needs and by occasional patronage. Merchants and bankers, tillers of the soil and handicraftsmen, and professional military men produced from their ranks very few intellectuals—the last, more than the first two groups. The secular and sacred officialdom and the legal profession nearly monopolized the capacity to read and write, and they attracted to their ranks—within the limits imposed by the opportunities afforded by the prevailing system of social selection—the intellectually disposed, and provided them with the leisure and facilities to perform intellectual work as a full-time vocation or as an auxiliary activity. The nature of the tasks which these intellectuals assumed, the relative quantitative meagerness of the intellectual heritage, the restricted size of their audience, and the small demand for intellectual services meant that intellectual activities required little corporate organization.

The development of the *modern* university—first in Germany, Holland, and Sweden, then in France, then in Great Britain, later in

the United States, Russia and Japan, and more recently in Canada, Australia, India and other Commonwealth countries—has changed the structure of the intellectual community. Science, which was once the work of amateurs—rentiers, civil servants, and noblemen, for the most part—and scholarship, which was almost a monopoly of monks, secular officials, and rentiers, have now come into the almost exclusive jurisdiction of universities. The relationship between teacher and pupil through the laboratory, the research seminar, and the dissertation, has led to a great multiplication of the scientific and scholarly output and strengthened the continuity of intellectual development. In turn, the degree of specialization has been greatly increased as a result of the greater density of scientific and scholarly knowledge and the pursuit of the idol of originality. The independent intellectual, and the intellectual living on the income from the sale of his works and from patronage, still exist, and their creativity and productivity have not obviously diminished. The intellectual, however, who lives from a salary as a member of an institution devoted to the performance of intellectual work—teaching and scientific and scholarly research—has greatly increased in numbers, and his works make up a larger and larger proportion of the total intellectual product of every modern society.

The increased volume and complexity of the heritage of science and scholarship and the demand for continuity as well as the wider insistence on diplomatization, have aggrandized the student body. This stratum of the intellectuals, which in the nineteenth century already had acquired a special position in European public life, in the twentieth century has greatly expanded. In every country where national sensibilities are very tender, and which has been in a state of political, economic, or cultural dependency, the university (and high school) student body has taken on a special role in political life. It has become the bearer of the idea of nationality.

Concomitantly the absorption of intellectuals into executive positions—"staff and line" posts within large corporate organizations concerned not with intellectual matters but with the exercise of authority, the production and sale of material objects, i.e., consumption goods, capital equipment, weapons of war, etc.—has greatly increased. Science, which was a profound toy of amateurs until the nineteenth century, became by the end of that century a vital

component of economic life. It has spread from the chemical industry into agriculture, into nearly every branch of industry, and into important sectors of commerce. In the first and second world wars, scientists, and increasingly pure scientists, were drawn into involvement with the armed forces. Scientists have become increasingly involved in research closely connected with agriculture, supported and conducted within institutions controlled by public and private bodies concerned with the improvement of plant and animal strains, with ecology, etc.

The spread of literacy, leisure, and material well-being, and the development of the mechanical means of reproduction and transmission of symbols in sounds and image, have also resulted in the creation of new corporate organizations in which intellectuals are employed. Whereas the creation of cultural objects for consumption by the educated was until nearly the end of the nineteenth century the work, at varying levels of quality, of the freelance intellectual, who sold his work to an enterpriser—a printer-bookseller—or whose work was commissioned by the latter, recent developments bring the intellectual producer of this kind of cultural object within the framework of a corporate organization, e.g. a film studio, a radio or television network.

The trend in the present century, therefore, in all countries of the world, liberal and totalitarian, has been toward an increasing incorporation of intellectuals into organized institutions. This represents a modification of the trend toward an increase in the proportion of institutionally independent intellectuals which had set in with the development of printing, and which in itself constituted—at least in numbers and in the quantity of intellectual products—a new phase in world history.

This diversity and specialization of intellectuals in the twentieth century raises a question concerning the extent to which they form a community, bound together by a sense of mutual affinity, by attachment to a common set of rules and common identifying symbols. They do not form such a community at present. There are, however, numerous subcommunities within the larger intellectual universe which do meet these criteria. The particular fields of the natural sciences and even science as a whole and scholarship as a whole do define actual communities bound together by the

acceptance of a common body of standards—and this, even though there are controversy and disagreement within every field. These communities are only partially and very inadequately embodied in the professional and scientific societies. The literary and artistic worlds, too, form such communities with vague and indeterminate boundaries—even more vague and indeterminate than the boundaries of the scholarly and scientific communities.

These communities are not mere figures of speech. Their common standards are continually being applied by each member in his own work and in the institutions which assess and select works and persons for appreciation or condemnation. They operate like a common-law system without formal enactment of their rules but by the repeated and incessant application and clarification of the rules. The editors of learned scientific, scholarly, and literary journals, the readers of publishing houses, the reviewers of scientific, scholarly, and literary works, and the appointments committees which pass judgments on the candidates for posts in universities or scientific research institutes, are the central institutions of these communities. The training of the oncoming generations in colleges and universities in the rules of the respective intellectual communities specifies these rules by example and transmits them by the identification of the research student with his teacher, just as in ancient India the disciple sitting at the feet of his *guru* acquired not only a knowledge of the concrete subject matter but also the rules and the disposition for its interpretation and application. The award of prizes and distinctions such as the Nobel Prize or election to membership in the Royal Society or to a famous continental academy establishes models and affirms the rightness of certain patterns of thought. The most original scientists, the most profound thinkers, the most learned scholars, the greatest writers and artists provide the models, which embody the rules of the community, and teach by the example of their achievement.

The worldwide character of the community formed by mathematicians or physicists or other natural scientists approximates most closely to the ideal of a body, bound together by a universal devotion to a common set of standards derived from a common tradition and acknowledged by all who have passed through the discipline of scientific training. Even here however, specialization and considerations of military security impair the universality of the

scientific community. In other fields of intellectual work, boundaries of language, national pride, and religious, political, and ethical beliefs engender reluctance to accept the claims of standards of intellectual communities to universal observance. Technical specialization, the reduction of the general humanistic component in secondary and higher education, and the intensification of the ideological factor in politics all resist the claims of the communities which in the modern world have nonetheless managed, despite enduring cleavages and intermittent crises, to command the allegiance of intellectuals.

Despite all impediments and counterclaims, the intellectual communities remain really effective systems of action. Whatever their distortions, they transmit the traditions of intellectual life and maintain its standards in various special fields and as a whole.

The Traditions of Intellectuals

Intellectual work is sustained by and transmits a complex tradition which persists through changes in the structure of the intellectual class. In these traditions, the most vital ones are the standards and rules in the light of which achievement is striven for and assessed and the substantive beliefs and symbols which constitute the heritage of valid achievement. It is by participation in these traditions of perception, appreciation, and expression, and by affirmation of the importance of performing in the modes accredited by these traditions, that the intellectual is defined. One could almost say that if these traditions did not confront the intellectual as an ineluctable inheritance, they could be created anew in each generation by the passionate disposition of the "natural" intellectual to be in contact, by perception, ratiocination, or expression, with symbols of general scope. They are traditions which are, so to speak, given by the nature of intellectual work. They are the immanent traditions of intellectual performance, the accepted body of rules of procedure, standards of judgment, criteria for the selection of subject matters and problems, modes of presentation, canons for the assessment of excellence, models of previous achievement and prospective emulation. Every field of intellectual performance, more than any other craft or profession possessing a long and acknowledged accumulation of achievements, has such a cultural tradition, always—though at varying rates—being added to and modified. What is called scientific

method in each particular field of science or scholarship, and the techniques of literary creation and of work in the plastic and other arts, possess such a tradition, and without that tradition even the greatest and most creative geniuses who seek to discover and create in that domain could not be effective. Colleges and universities, scientific, scholarly, and artistic journals, museums, galleries—in short, the whole system of intellectual institutions—exist to select those who are qualified to work within these traditions and to train them in their appreciation, application, and development. Even the most creative and rapidly developing domains of intellectual performance could disregard them only with very great loss.

These traditions, though they make neither direct nor logically implicit reference to the position of their adherents in relation to the surrounding society and the authorities which rule it, seem from their very structure to entail a measure of tension between themselves and the laity. The very intensity and concentration of commitment to these values which are remote from the executive routines of daily life in family, firm, office, factory, church, and civil service, from the pleasures of the ordinary man and the obligations, compromises, and corruptions of those who exercise commanding authority in church, state, business, and army—entail an at least incipient sense, on each side, of the distance which separates these two trends of value orientation.

Intellectual work arose from religious preoccupations. In the early history of the human race, it tended, in its concern with the ultimate or at least with what lies beyond the immediate concrete experience, to operate with religious symbols. It continues to share with genuine religious experience the fascination with the sacred or the ultimate ground of thought and experience, and the aspiration to enter into intimate contact with it. In secular intellectual work, this involves the search for the truth, for the principles embedded in events and actions, or for the establishment of a relationship between the self and the essential, whether the relationship be cognitive, appreciative, or expressive. Intellectual action of an intense kind contains and continues the deeper religious attitude, the striving for contact with the most decisive and significant symbols and the realities underlying those symbols. It is therefore no stretching of the term to say that science and philosophy, even when they are not religious in a conventional sense, are as concerned with

the sacred as religion itself. In consequence of this, in our enumeration of the traditions under which intellectual pursuits are carried on, we should say that the tradition of awesome respect and of serious striving for contact with the sacred is perhaps the first, the most comprehensive, and the most important of all traditions of the intellectuals. In the great religious cultures of Islam, Buddhism, Taoism, and Hinduism, prior to the emergence of a differentiated modern intellectual class, the care of the sacred through the mastery, interpretation, and exposition of sacred writings and the cultivation of the appropriate mental states or qualities were the first interests of the intellectuals. (In China, the development of a class of Confucian intellectual-civil servants produced its own tradition, more civil and aesthetic than religious in the conventional meaning.) In the West too, in antiquity, a substantial section of the philosophical intelligentsia bore this tradition, and, on the higher reaches, even those who cut themselves off from the tribal and territorial religions continued to be impelled by such considerations (Pythagoras, Euclid, Ptolemy, Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Lucretius, Seneca). In modern times, although attracting a diminishing share of the creative capacities of the oncoming intellectual elite, religious orientations still remain a major preoccupation of a substantial fraction of the educated classes and not less of the most creative minds.

With this striving for contact with the ultimately important comes the self-esteem which always accompanies the performance of important activities. One who makes an effort to understand the traditions of the intellectuals and their relations with the authorities who rule the other sections of society at any given time, must bear in mind the crucial significance of the self-regard which comes from preoccupation and contact with the most vital facts of human and cosmic existence, and the implied attitude of derogation toward those who act in more mundance or more routine capacities.[2]

2. Naturally, this sentiment is not equally shared by all intellectuals. Not all are equally involved in these "vital facts"—and therefore not all have the same feeling of the dignity of their own activities. Intellectuals vary greatly in their sensitivity to their traditions—just as do the laity with respect to their traditions—but even in those who are relatively insensitive, there remains a considerable unwitting assimilation of many elements of these central traditions.

When intellectuals ceased to be solely bearers of religiosity, the very act of separation, however gradual and unwitting and undeliberate, set up a tension between the intellectuals and the religious authority of their society. Insofar as they were not merely civil servants and counselors to princes—itself an unsettling, tension-generating relationship—there was created a tension between the public authorities and the intellectuals. Ecclesiastical and exemplary religious authority became an object of the distrust of intellectuals, and insofar as the authority of the government of earthly affairs associated itself with the religious powers, it too shared in that skepticism. The attitude is by no means universal, nor need the distrust be aggressive. Confucian civil servants, disdainful toward Taoism or Buddhism, did not become rebels against their sovereigns as long as they themselves were treated respectfully. In the West, where the separation of religious and other intellectual activities has become most pronounced, a more general feeling of distance from authority has been engendered and has become one of the strongest of the traditions of the intellectuals. First in the West, and then in the past half-century in Africa and Asia among intellectuals who have come under the Western traditions, the tradition of distrust of secular and ecclesiastical authority—and in fact of tradition as such—has become the chief secondary tradition of the intellectuals. As such, it is nurtured by many of the subsidiary traditions such as scientism, revolutionism, progressivism, etc., which we shall treat below.

The tension between the intellectuals and the powers—their urge to submit to authority as the bearer of the highest good, whether it be order or progress or some other value, and to resist or condemn authority as a betrayer of the highest values—comes ultimately from the constitutive orientation of the intellectuals toward the sacred. Practically all the more concrete traditions in the light and shadows of which intellectuals have lived express this tension. We shall note, in brief, some of these traditions which, however diverse in their age and origins, have played a great part in forming the relations of the modern intellectuals to authority. They are (a) the tradition of scientism, (b) the romantic tradition, (c) the apocalyptic tradition, (d) the populistic tradition, and (e) the tradition of antiintellectual order.

All of these traditions are in conflict with other traditions of deference toward ecclesiastical and temporal authorities and the expectation of a career in their service. Even in those modern cultures where the traditions of the intellectuals' acceptance of authority are strongest, in modern Britain and modern Germany, they have by no means had the field to themselves. Similarly in modern Asia, where variants of the traditions of devotion to the religiously sacred values and the service of temporal authority have, in ancient as well as modern times, had a powerful hold, anti-authoritarian and anticivil traditions, diffused from the West and nurtured by related traditions derived from Taoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, have found an eager and widespread reception.

The *tradition of scientism* is the tradition which denies the validity of tradition as such; it insists on the testing of everything which is received and on its rejection if it does not correspond with the "facts of experience." It is the tradition which demands the avoidance of every extraneous impediment to the precise perception of reality, regardless of whether that impediment comes from tradition, from institutional authority, or from internal passion or impulse. It is critical of the arbitrary and the irrational. In its emphasis on the indispensability of firsthand and direct experience, it sets itself in opposition to everything which comes between the mind of the knowing individual and "reality." It is easy to see how social convention and the traditional authority associated with institutions would fall prey to the ravages of this powerfully persuasive and corrosive tradition.

The *romantic tradition* appears at first sight to be in irreconcilable opposition to the tradition of scientism. At certain points, such as the estimation of the value of impulse and passion, there is a real and unbridgeable antagonism. In many important respects, however, they share fundamental features. Romanticism starts with the appreciation of the spontaneous manifestations of the essence of concrete individuality. Hence it values originality, i.e. the unique, that which is produced from the genius of the individual (or the folk), in contrast with the stereotyped and traditional actions of the philistine. Since ratiocination and detachment obstruct spontaneous expression, they are thought to be life-destroying. Institutions which have rules and which prescribe the conduct of the individual

members by conventions and commands are likewise viewed as life-destroying. The bourgeois family, mercantile activity, the market, indeed civil society in general, with its curb on enthusiasm and its sober acceptance of obligation, are repugnant to the romantic tradition—all are the enemies of spontaneity and genuineness; they impose a role on the individual and do not permit him to be himself. They kill what is living in the folk. Civil society has no place for the intellectual, who is afflicted with a sense of his moral solitude within it. The affinities of the romantic tradition to the revolutionary criticism of the established order and to the bohemian refusal to have more part in it than is absolutely necessary are obvious. It too is one of the most explosively antiauthoritarian, and even anticivil, powers of modern intellectual life.

The *revolutionary tradition*, which has found so many of its leading recipients and exponents among intellectuals, draws much from scientism and romanticism, but essentially it rests on one much older, namely the *apocalyptic* or millenarian tradition. The belief that the evil world as we know it, so full of temptation and corruption, will come to an end one day and will be replaced by a purer and better world, originates in the apocalyptic outlook of the prophets of the Old Testament. It is promulgated in the Christian idea of the Kingdom of God, which the earlier Christians expected in their own time, and it lingers as a passionately turbulent stream, dammed up and hidden by the efforts of the Church, but recurrently appearing on the surface of history through the teaching and action of heretical sects. It received a powerful impetus from Manichaeanism. In the Donatists, in the Bogomils, in the Albigensians and Waldensians, in the Hussites and Lollards, in the Anabaptists and in the Fifth Monarchy Men, in the belief that the evil world, the world of the Children of Darkness, would be destroyed and supplanted by the world of the Children of Light after a decisive judgement by the Sovereign of the universe, this tradition has lived on. It has come down to our own times in a transmuted form. Although it still exists in its religious form among numerous Christian and quasi-Christian sects in Europe, America, and Africa, its true recipients are the modern revolutionary movements and above all the Marxian movements. Marxian writers of the early part of this century acknowledged the Anabaptists, the Fifth

Monarchy Men, the Levellers and the Diggers, as their forerunners, and although the Bolsheviks have been less willing to admit Russian sectarianism as an antecedent, there can be little doubt that the Russian sectarian image of the world and its cataclysmic history made it easier for the Marxian conception of society and its historical destiny to find acceptance in Russia. The disposition to distinguish sharply between good and evil and to refuse to admit the permissibility of any admixture, the insistence that justice be done though the heavens fall, the obstinate refusal to compromise or to tolerate compromise—all the features of doctrinaire politics, or the politics of the ideal, which are so common among the modern intellectuals, must be attributed in some measure at least to this tradition.

Another of the traditions which has everywhere in the world moved intellectuals in the last century and a half is the *populistic tradition.* Populism is a belief in the creativity and in the superior moral worth of the ordinary people, of the uneducated and unintellectual; it perceives their virtue in their actual qualities or in their potentialities. In the simplicity and wisdom of their ways, the populist tradition alleges that it has discerned virtues which are morally superior to those found in the educated and in the higher social classes. Even where, as in Marxism, the actual state of the lower classes is not esteemed, they are alleged to be by destiny fitted to become the salvationary nucleus of their society. Romanticism with its distrust of the rational and calculating elements in bourgeois society, revolutionism with its hatred of the upper classes as the agents of wicked authority, the apocalyptic attitude which sees the last coming first and which alleges that official learning (religious and secular) has falsified the truths which the Last Judgement and the leap into freedom will validate—all these manifest a populistic disposition. German historical and philological scholarship in the nineteenth century—imbued with the romantic hatred of the rational, the economic, the analytic spirit, which it castigated as the source and product of the whole revolutionary, rationalistic trend of Western European culture—discovered in the nameless masses, the folk, the fountain of linguistic and cultural creativity. French socialism went a step further, and Marxism elevated this essentially romantic outlook into a systematic "scientific" theory.

In all countries peripheral to the most creative centers of Western culture at the height of its hegemony over the modern mind, intellectuals were both fascinated and rendered uneasy by the culture of Western Europe. Not only in early nineteenth-century Germany, but in Russia of the fifties, in the twentieth-century middlewestern United States, in Brazil (in the doctrine of "Indianism"), in the resentful and embittered Weimar Republic, in India since the ascendancy of Gandhi and in the emerging intelligentsias of the new countries of Africa, populistic tendencies are massively at work. In all these countries the intellectuals have been educated either in foreign countries or in institutions within their own countries modeled on those at the center of the culture they sought or seek to emulate. In all these countries the intellectuals have developed anxiety about whether they have not allowed themselves to be currupted by excessive permeation with the admired foreign culture. To identify themselves with the people, to praise the culture of the ordinary people as richer, truer, wiser, and more relevant than the foreign culture in which they have themselves been educated, has been a way out of this distress. In most of these cases it is a protest against the "official" culture, the culture of the higher civil servants, of the universities, and of the culture—political, literary, and philosophical—which has come out of them. As such, it has fused easily with the other traditions of hostility to civil institutions and civil authority.

There is another tradition, closely connected with all of these and yet apparently their negation, which merits mention. This is the *antiintellectual tradition of order.* Best known in the West in the form of French positivism (Saint-Simon and Comte), it has its roots in antiquity and in the belief that excessive intellectual analysis and discussion can erode the foundations of order. Plato's attitude toward poets had its parallel in the burning of the books by the former Confucian, Li-Ssu, at the origin of the Ch'in Dynasty; Hobbes's analysis of the role of intellectuals in bringing about the English civil war, Taine's interpretation of the significance of the *philosophes* in bringing on the French Revolution of 1789, and the ideas of Joseph de Maistre, all testify to the ambivalence in the traditional antiauthoritarianism of intellectuals.

In Conclusion

Intellectuals are indispensable to any society, not just to industrial society, and the more complex the society, the more indispensable they are. An effective collaboration between intellectuals and the authorities which govern society is a requirement for order and continuity in public life and for the integration of the wider reaches of the laity into society. Yet, the original impetus to intellectual performance, and the traditions to which it has given rise and which are sustained by the institutions through which intellectual performance is made practicable, generate a tension between intellectuals and the laity, high and low. This tension can never be eliminated, either by a complete consensus between the laity and the intellectuals or by the complete ascendancy of the intellectuals over the laity.

Within these two extreme and impossible alternatives, a wide variety of forms of consensus and dissensus in the relations of the intellectuals and the ruling powers of society have existed. The discovery and the achievement of the optimum balance of civility and intellectual creativity are the tasks of the statesman and the responsible intellectual. The study of these diverse patterns of consensus and dissensus, their institutional and cultural concomitants, and the conditions under which they have emerged and waned are the first items on the agenda of the comparative study of the intellectuals and the powers.